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This paper examines audit report lag in Malaysian public listed companies, following the 
implementation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2001. It departs from 
the standard audit report lag studies by incorporating characteristics of the board of 
directors and the audit committee. Multivariate analysis using 628 annual reports for the 
year ended  2002 indicates that active and larger audit committees shorten audit lag. 
However, we fail to find evidence that audit committee independence and expertise are 
associated with the timeliness of the audit report. 
 





Audit report lag, which is the number of days from fiscal year end to audit report 
date, or inordinate audit lag, jeopardises the quality of financial reporting by not 
providing timely information to investors. Delayed disclosure of an auditor's 
opinion on the true and fair view of financial information prepared by the 
management exacerbates the information asymmetry and increases the 
uncertainty in investment decisions. Consequently, this may adversely affect 
investors' confidence in the capital market. Givoly and Palmon (1982) assert that 
audit lag is the single most important determinant of timeliness in earnings 
announcement, which in turn, determines the market reaction to earnings 
announcement (Chambers & Penman, 1984; Kross & Schroeder, 1984). Knechel 
and Payne (2001) suggest that an unexpected reporting lag may be associated 
with lower quality information. In a study on enforcement actions by the 
Malaysian capital market regulators for financial misreporting and fraud, the 
author states that "in most cases, financial misreporting is often preceded or 
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accompanied by a lag in submitting the financial statements on time" (Mohd-
Sulaiman, 2008). 
 
Given the importance of audit timeliness to investors, identifying the 
determinants of audit lag continues to attract the attention of researchers as 
illustrated in recent studies by Ettredge, Li and Sun (2006), Bonson-Ponte, 
Escobar-Rodriguez and Borrero-Dominguez (2008), Al-Ajmi (2008), Lee, Mande 
and Son (2008, 2009), Afify (2009) and Krishnan and Yang (2009). Although 
Lee et al. (2008) suggest that the audit committee may influence audit timeliness, 
they do not test the predicted association. Afify (2009) documents that the 
voluntary establishment of an audit committee reduces audit lag in Egypt. A 
comprehensive review of the literature on audit committee and financial reporting 
by Bédard and Gendron (2010) indicates that the association between audit 
committee and timeliness of financial reporting is rarely investigated. We address 
the gap in the literature by providing evidence on the association between audit 
committee and audit lag.  
 
One of the key responsibilities of an audit committee is to oversee the 
financial reporting process, which includes ensuring timely submission of 
financial statements (Bursa Malaysia Corporate Governance Guide, 2009). The 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (revised 2007) recommends the 
following attributes of an audit committee as "best practices": (i) comprised of at 
least three members, a majority of whom are independent, (ii) all members should 
be non-executive and financially literate, with at least one being a financial 
expert, i.e., a member of an accounting association or body and (iii) meet 
regularly with due notice of issues to be discussed (Part 2, BBI and BBV). In 
addition, the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (2006) 
mandate that the chairman should be an independent director (Para 15.11). The 
Bursa Malaysia Corporate Governance Guide (2009) emphasises that at a 
minimum, the audit committee should meet at least four times a year (Para 2.6.2).  
 
Given that an audit committee imbued with "best practices" is expected 
to deliver in terms of strengthening the financial reporting system, our study 
attempts to present empirical evidence of the association between audit 
committee characteristics and audit lag. Apart from the audit committee, we also 
investigate whether the board composition can further explain cross-sectional 
variations in audit report lag. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance that 
was first issued in 2000 makes certain recommendations on how to constitute an 
effective board. The Code advocates that "there should be a clearly accepted 
division of responsibilities at the head of the company" implying that the roles of 
the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should not be combined 
and held by the same person (i.e., non-CEO duality) (Part 2, AAII). The Code 
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also recommends that "to be effective, independent non-executive directors need 
to make up at least one third of the membership of the board" (Part 2, AAIII).  
 
By examining the effect of board size, board independence, CEO duality 
and audit committee size, independence, expertise and diligence, proxied by 
frequency of meetings, on audit lag, our study extends the literature on audit 
committee and audit timeliness. Previous studies on audit lag in Malaysia by Che-
Ahmad and Abidin (2008) and Raja-Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) do not 
address the role of corporate governance, as their sample periods are prior to the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code in 2000. However, these studies 
provide a useful benchmark to compare audit lag pre- and post-introduction of the 
Corporate Governance Code in Malaysia. We expect CEO duality to reduce audit 
timeliness, whereas board and audit committee independence, audit committee 
financial expertise, audit committee diligence and audit committee size would 
enhance audit timeliness. We also expect shorter audit lag in the post-Code era, 
compared to pre-Code era. We make no prediction on the association between 
board size and audit lag.  
 
Apart from contributing to the literature on audit committee and audit 
timeliness, our study also falls under the strand of literature that examines the 
consequences of the regulatory changes introduced around the world to 
strengthen corporate governance and corporate transparency. For example, Lobo 
and Zhou (2006) show that after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX), there is an increase in conservatism in financial reporting, and firms 
report lower discretionary accruals after SOX compared to the period preceding 
SOX. Bartov and Cohen (2009) document that the propensity to meet/beat analyst 
expectations declined significantly in the post-SOX period. In another study, 
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) document that accrual-based earnings management 
increased steadily from 1987 until 2002, followed by a significant decline 
thereafter. Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities declined 
prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting 
that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods 
after the passage of SOX. Laksmana (2008) shows that the disclosure of 
executive compensation practices in the US has generally increased over the 
period 1993–2002 after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
introduced the Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules requiring companies to 
provide a report justifying their compensation policies. She also shows that the 
practice of compensation transparency is lower when the compensation 
committee has fewer members, meets less frequently and is less independent.  
 
In Asia, Herz and McGurr (2006) show that following SOX, Hong Kong 
and Singapore companies have become more transparent by including greater 
footnote disclosures in their financial statements. Vichitsarawong, Eng and Meek 
Mohamad Naimi Mohamad-Nor et al. 
60 
(2010) document that following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, 
earnings conservatism and timeliness among companies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand have improved due to the implementation of various 
corporate governance reform measures. In Malaysia, Abdul-Wahab, How and 
Verhoeven (2007) show that compliance with the corporate governance "best 
practices" improved significantly after the introduction of the Code in 2000, with 
the CG Index rising sharply from 19.7% for 1999–2000 to 50.7% for 2001–2002.  
 
Our evidence indicates that audit committees with more members that 
meet at least four times a year promote audit timeliness. Our findings echo the 
results obtained by Kent, Routledge and Stewart (2010) that accruals quality is 
higher for larger and more active audit committees. The other board and audit 
committee characteristics that we tested do not seem to influence audit report lag. 
There is also a reduction in audit lag from 116 days as reported in Che-Ahmad 
and Abidin (2008) based on the year 1993 sample, to 100 days based on year 
2002, as per our sample.  
  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews 
the literature on audit report lag and related studies on the association between 
audit committee, board characteristics and the quality of financial reporting, and 
develops the testable hypotheses. This is followed by a section outlining the 
design of the research. The results are presented in the subsequent section starting 
with the descriptive statistics for the full sample, followed by descriptive statistics 
for the four subsamples of firms partitioned by length of audit lag, and the 
correlation and regression analysis. The final section concludes and discusses 
limitations and suggestions for future studies.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous Studies on Audit Lag 
 
Studies on audit lag began more than 30 years ago and some of the earliest 
studies were done by Courtis (1976) and Gilling (1977) in New Zealand, Davies 
and Whittred (1980) in Australia, Garsombke (1981) in the US and Ashton, Graul 
and Newton (1989) in Canada. Ashton, Willingham and Elliott (1987) investigate 
the relationship between audit lags with corporate attributes. They find that the 
lag is positively associated with the client's revenue and business complexity, but 
is negatively related with client status (represented by 1 for companies traded on 
an organised exchange or over the counter, and zero otherwise), quality of 
internal control (rated 1 if auditor judged the internal control quality as "virtually 
none" and five if "excellent") and relative mix of audit job (rated 1 if all audit 
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work performed subsequent to year end and four if most work performed prior to 
year-end).  
 
Courtis (1976) and Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) report that companies 
which experienced losses have a longer lag. Bamber, Bamber and Schoderbek 
(1993) document that audit lag is influenced by an auditor's business risk 
associated with the client and audit specific events that are expected to require 
additional audit work such as extraordinary items, net losses and qualified audit 
opinions. They also find that large clients have a shorter audit lag.  
 
Schwartz and Soo (1996) show that audit lag increased for companies 
that switched their auditor late in the fiscal year. This result is consistent with 
their expectation that companies change their auditor early in their fiscal year for 
positive reasons, whereas late auditor switching is driven by extended auditor-
client negotiations or opinion shopping, which leads to longer audit lag. 
 
Henderson and Kaplan (2000) focus on audit lag in the banking sector 
and their results reveal that a financial institution takes less time to issue an audit 
report because it operates in a highly regulated industry. Leventis, Weetman and 
Caramanis (2005) suggest that any attempts to regulate more closely the 
timeliness of audited financial reports should focus on audit-specific issues (e.g., 
audit fees or audit hours, proxied by the presence of extraordinary items in the 
income statement, the number of remarks in the subject to/except for audit 
opinions) rather than on the audit client's characteristics. They find that the type 
of auditors, audit fees, number of remarks in audit report, extraordinary items and 
uncertainty of opinion in the audit report are statistically significant in explaining 
variations in audit timeliness.  
 
To summarise, previous research on the determinants of audit lag shows 
that it is influenced by a host of client, auditor and financial factors. The next sub-
section discusses the possible association between corporate governance and 
audit lag and develop the related hypotheses. 
 
Corporate Governance and Audit Lag 
 
Corporate boards are responsible for monitoring the quality of information 
contained in financial statements that are communicated to the public. The Bursa 
Malaysia Corporate Governance Guide (2009) reiterates that: 
 
The board is required by law to ensure that the financial 
statements of the company represent a true and fair view of the 
state of affairs of the company and that they are prepared in 
accordance with applicable approved accounting standards. To 
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assist in discharging the board's fiduciary duties, the 
responsibilities for overseeing the financial reporting process is 
often delegated to the audit committee.  
 
The audit committee has a heavy role in the financial reporting process, 
and its duties as stated in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007) 
and the Bursa Malaysia Corporate Governance Guide (2009), among others, are 
to (i) discuss the nature and scope of the audit with the external auditor before the 
audit commences and ensure coordination where multiple audit firms are 
involved and (ii) discuss problems and reservation arising from the audit and to 
review the financial statements focusing on compliance with accounting 
standards, going concern assumption, audit adjustments, accounting estimates, 
unusual transactions and related party transactions.  
 
A survey of the related literature published during 1994–2008 on the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in strengthening the financial reporting 
system by Bédard and Gendron (2010) indicates that the associations between 
audit committee size, independence, competency and meetings with the quality of 
financial reporting are stronger in the US than other countries. Based on their 
review, they show that the characteristics of the audit committee that have the 
greatest impact (with the figures in parentheses indicating the proportion of 
studies/analyses reviewed that show positive association between the 
characteristic and audit committee effectiveness) are existence (69%), followed 
by independence (57%), competence (51%), number of meetings (30%) and size 
(22%). They conclude that the effectiveness of audit committee practices may 
vary with "environmental factors such as concentration of ownership, 
enforcement level and exposure to lawsuits" (Ibid), and mimicking the best US 
practices regarding audit committees may not deliver the desired effect. 
Borrowing from the insights generated by some of the studies reviewed in Bédard 
and Gendron (2010) and other studies, especially in Asia, that are not covered in 
Bédard and Gendron (2010), we present the hypothesised association between 
audit committee characteristics and audit report lag below. We also borrow 
insights from other studies on the relationship between board characteristics and 
accruals quality to develop hypotheses linking board characteristics with another 
aspect of financial reporting quality; namely, the timeliness of audited financial 
statements. 
 
Audit committee size 
 
Bursa Malaysia requires a listed company to appoint an audit committee from 
amongst its directors which must be composed of not fewer than three members. 
Potential problems in the financial reporting process are more likely to be 
uncovered and resolved with a larger audit committee. This could arise if a larger 
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committee size increases the resources available to the audit committee and 
improves the quality of oversight. Li, Pike and Haniffa (2008) and Persons (2009) 
show that the audit committee size influences corporate disclosures. In Malaysia, 
Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) provide weak evidence that audit 
committee size is positively associated with the quality of financial information 
disclosure, proxied by the accuracy of initial public offering management 
earnings forecast. However, most of the studies reviewed by Bédard and Gendron 
(2010) indicate that size of the audit committee is not an important determinant of 
effectiveness, and they caution that the incremental costs of poorer 
communication, coordination, involvement and decision making associated with 
a  larger audit committee might outweigh the benefits. Based on the above, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1:  There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and 
audit report lag. 
 
Audit committee independence  
 
One of the objectives of the audit committee is to give unbiased reviews on 
financial information, and audit committee independence can contribute to the 
quality of financial reporting (Kirk, 2000). Beasley and Salterio (2001) argue that 
companies that have the incentive and ability to increase the strength of the audit 
committee will do it by including more outside directors in the committee than 
the minimum number as required by legislation. The Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia stipulate that all listed companies must have audit committees 
comprising three members of whom a majority shall be independent. The Revised 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007 reinforces the desirability of 
audit committee independence by excluding executive directors from 
membership. Meanwhile, SOX requires firms to have audit committees 
comprised solely of an independent director who is not an affiliate of the firm and 
not accepting any compensation from the firm other than the director's fees. 
 
Many studies have uncovered empirical regularities that audit committee 
independence enhances the quality of financial reporting. Klein (2002), Abbott, 
Parker and Peters (2004), Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Persons (2005) 
and Archambeault, DeZoort and Hermanson (2008) show that audit committee 
independence reduces earnings management, the likelihood of financial reporting 
restatement and financial reporting fraud. Furthermore, the likelihood that 
companies receive a going concern opinion is influenced by the number of 
outside directors in the audit committee (Carcello & Neal, 2000). Krishnan 
(2005) finds that independent audit committees are significantly less likely to be 
associated with the incidence of internal control problems over financial 
reporting. A meta-analysis conducted by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) of studies 
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on audit committee independence and financial reporting quality concludes that 
the independence of the audit committee has more impact in enhancing audit 
quality through averting going concern reports and auditor resignations than it is 
at enhancing accruals quality and avoiding restatements. A more extensive review 
on the audit committee literature by Bédard and Gendron (2010) supports the 
view that independent audit committees contribute positively to the financial 
reporting process, which motivates the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and audit report lag.  
 
Audit committee meeting  
 
The audit committee meeting is the place for directors to discuss the financial 
reporting process and it is where the process of monitoring financial reporting 
occurs. An independent audit committee is unlikely to be effective unless the 
committee is also active (Menon & Williams, 1994). The National Committee on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission 
(1987), states that an audit committee which intends to play a major role in 
oversight would need to maintain a high level of activity. One way to measure the 
diligence of the audit committee is by considering the number of meetings held. 
The audit committee should meet regularly, with due notice of issues to be 
discussed, and record its conclusions in discharging its duties and responsibilities. 
The Blue Ribbon Committee on audit committees in the US advocates that an 
audit committee is to meet at least four times per year. The Guidance on Audit 
Committees in the UK prescribes that the number of meetings required in a year 
should be no fewer than three, in view of the fact that the requirement for interim 
financial reporting in the UK is semi-annual.  
 
The Bédard and Gendron (2010) analysis shows that most of the studies 
on audit committee meeting and financial reporting quality that they reviewed do 
not find significant associations. However, their studies exclude the studies of Li 
et al. (2008) and Xie, Davidson and Dadalt (2003). Li et al. (2008) show that 
audit committee meeting frequency is positively related with level of corporate 
disclosure. Xie et al. (2003) document that when audit committees meet more 
frequently, discretionary accruals are lower. In addition, Abbott et al. (2004), 
Vafeas (2005) and Persons (2009) document that higher level of audit committee 
activity is significantly related to a lower incidence of financial restatement, or 
reporting a small earnings increase, or fraudulent financial reporting.  
 
Raghunandan, Rama and Scarbrough (1998) and Abbott, Parker, Peters 
and Raghunandan, (2003a and 2003b) argue that by meeting frequently, the audit 
committee will remain informed and knowledgeable about accounting or auditing 
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issues and can direct internal and external audit resources to address the matter in 
a timely fashion. During the audit committee meeting the problems encountered 
in the financial reporting process are identified, but if the frequency of the 
meetings is low the problems may not be rectified and resolved within a short 
period of time. Thus, it is predicted that a company that has a higher number of 
audit committee meetings (at least four as prescribed in the Bursa Malaysia 
Corporate Governance Guide 2009) will have a shorter audit lag. 
 
H3:  There is a negative relationship between an audit committee that 
meets at least four times a year and audit report lag.  
 
Audit committee financial expertise 
 
Audit committees are responsible for numerous duties that require a high degree 
of accounting sophistication such as understanding auditing issues and risks and 
the audit procedures proposed to address them, comprehending audit judgments 
and understanding the substance of disagreement between the management and 
an external auditor, and evaluating judgmental accounting areas. Felo and Solieri 
(2009) classify audit committee members as financial experts if they have past 
employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional 
certification in accounting, or any other financial oversight experience or 
backgrounds which result in financial sophistication.  
 
Previous studies show that the fraudulent financial reporting companies 
have few members that have expertise in accounting (McMullen & Raghunandan, 
1996; Beasley, Carcello & Hermanson, 1999). DeZoort and Salterio (2001) show 
that audit committee members with previous experience and knowledge in 
financial reporting and audit are more likely to make expert judgments than those 
without. Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004) and Bédard et al. (2004) document 
that audit committee financial expertise reduces financial restatements or 
constrains the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. 
DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) document that appointment of accounting financial 
experts generates positive stock market reaction in line with market expectation 
that the audit committee members' financial sophistication is useful in executing 
their role as financial monitors. Krishnan (2005) and Zhang, Zhou and Zhou 
(2007) find that firms are more likely to be identified with deficiencies in internal 
control over financial reporting if their audit committees have less financial 
expertise. All in all, these studies suggest that financially knowledgeable audit 
committee members are more likely to prevent and detect material misstatements. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is proffered: 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between audit committee financial 
expertise and audit report lag.  




One of the disadvantages associated with a large board is a communication/ 
coordination problem, which makes a large board a less efficient monitor than a 
small board (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). The directors' free-rider problem 
is also more intense in a large board than a small board (Jensen, 1993). Mak and 
Li (2001) and Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) argue that a large 
board creates less participation, is less organised, and is less able to reach an 
agreement. Beasley (1996) shows that an increase in board size is related to 
higher incidence of fraud cases. Vafeas (2000) documents firms with small 
boards exhibit greater earnings informativeness, i.e. their reported earnings solicit 
a stronger investor response, as reflected by stock returns. Xie et al. (2003) also 
argue that a smaller board may be less encumbered with bureaucratic problems, 
more functional and more able to provide better financial reporting oversight. 
Contrary to their expectation, their evidence suggests that earnings management 
is more prevalent among smaller boards. In Malaysia, previous studies have 
yielded mixed results on the effect of board size and the quality of financial 
reporting. Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed-Ali (2006) show that board size and 
earnings management are positively related. Meanwhile, Bradbury, Mak and Tan 
(2006) find the opposite. The above conflicting evidence precludes a directional 
prediction on the effect of board size, and thus, we hypothesised: 
 
H5:  There is a relationship between board size and audit report lag. 
 
Board independence  
 
Independent non-executive directors with the right skill sets who have no 
business and other relationships which could interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of the shareholders 
are viewed to be in a better position to monitor management than inside directors. 
Because of their high degree of impartiality, they are believed to be willing to 
stand up to the CEO to protect the interests of all shareholders (Duchin, 
Matsusaka & Ozbas, 2010). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors 
have incentives to carry out their tasks and not collude with managers to harm 
shareholders because "there is substantial devaluation of human capital when 
internal controls break down" (p. 35). Empirical evidence in the US, UK, Greece, 
Italy, China, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore are generally supportive of their 
positive monitoring role. Studies indicate that inclusion of independent or outside 
directors in the board improves disclosure quality (Forker, 1992; Chen & Jaggi, 
2000; Sengupta, 2004; Ajinkya, Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007; Petra, 2007), decreases the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005), curtails the magnitude of earnings management 
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(Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Jaggi, Leung & 
Gul, 2009; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010), lowers the incidence of related 
party transactions (Dahya, Dimitrov & McConnell, 2008), and enhances firm 
performance (Choi, Park & Yoo, 2007; Dahya et al., 2008). However, the 
evidence to date indicates that in Malaysia board independence does not enhance 
corporate transparency (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Wan-Hussin, 2009) and 
constrain financial restatements (Abdullah, Mohamad-Yusof & Mohamad-Nor, 
2010), which lends credence to the view that the presence of independent 
directors is merely a box-ticking exercise, is ceremonial and like window 
dressing. We posit: 
 
H6:  There is a negative relationship between board independence and 
audit report lag. 
 
CEO duality  
 
When the CEO also serves the dual position of chairperson of the board (i.e., 
CEO duality exists), this signifies the concentration of decision making power 
and hampers board independence and reduce the ability of the board to execute its 
oversight roles. Jensen (1993) advocates the separation of the positions of the 
CEO and chairperson to avoid conflicts of interests. The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2001, 2007) recommends companies to separate the two 
roles to ensure proper checks and balances on the top management. A number of 
studies document that non-CEO duality contributes to disclosure quality. These 
include Forker (1992), Ho and Wong (2001), Gul and Leung (2004), Abdelsalam 
and Street (2007), Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), Huafang and Jinguo (2007) 
and Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2008). However, there are also studies in Singapore 
and the US such as Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Petra (2007), respectively, 
that do not find that CEO duality impairs accounting quality. Al-Arussi, Selamat 
and Mohd-Hanefah (2009) document how CEO duality adversely affects the 
internet financial disclosures made by Malaysian companies. Likewise, Mohd-
Saleh, Rahmat and Mohd-Iskandar (2005) document how CEO duality has an 
unfavourable effect on earnings quality in Malaysia. In contrast, Abdul-Rahman 
and Mohamed-Ali (2006), Bradbury et al. (2006) and Abdullah et al. (2010) show 
that a CEO who also acts as a chairperson is not associated with earnings 
management or restatements in Malaysia. Based on the above reasoning, it is 
predicted that the separation of roles between the CEO and chairperson will 
improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce the audit lag. The 
hypothesis is thus:  
 
H7:  There is a positive relationship between CEO duality and audit report 
lag.  




Out of 856 non-financial companies listed on the main and second boards of 
Bursa Malaysia in 2002, a sample of 628 companies are selected, as described in 
Table 1. Finance-related companies are excluded due to their nature of business, 
and they are governed under different rules and regulations. Meanwhile, 44 Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) companies are removed because they are newly listed and 
this might affect their preparation of audited accounts. Information on audit 
report date is not available for 12 companies. Thirty seven companies do not have 
annual reports, and 89 companies are further eliminated due to incomplete or 
ambiguous data. The final sample represents 73% of all non-financial companies 





Main Board companies 






Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in 2002 
46 
44 
Unavailable audit report date 





Unidentified data 55 
Total sample 628  
 
Annual reports for the year ended 2002 for the sample companies are 
examined. The sample period is chosen because the disclosures on the extent of 
compliance with the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance recommendations 
with regards to the constitution of boards are available from the second half of 
2001.  
 
The audit report lag model used in this study is adapted from prior studies 
to accommodate the corporate governance variables and the Malaysian 
environment (see for example, Bamber et al., 1993; Lawrence & Glover, 1998; 
Leventis et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009, Krishnan & Yang, 2009). The audit report 
lag model is as follows: 
 
AUDLAG = β0 + β1ACSIZE + β2ACIND + β3ACMEET4 + β4ACEXP + β5BSIZE 
+ β6BIND + β7CEODUAL + β8BIG4 + β9DEC31 + β10SUBS + 
β11GCOPIN + β12LNSIZE + . 
 
 




AUDLAG = number of days from fiscal year end to the date of audit report. 
ACSIZE = number of audit committee members. 
ACIND = proportion of independent nonexecutive directors on audit 
committee.  
ACMEET4 = 1, if at least 4 audit committee meetings are held during the year, 
0 otherwise. 
ACEXP = proportion of audit committee members who have accounting or 
related financial management expertise.  
BSIZE = number of board of director members. 
BIND = proportion of independent directors on board. 
CEODUAL = 1, if CEO and Chairman is the same person, 0 otherwise. 
BIG4 = 1, if the auditor is PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, 
KPMG or Deloitte, 0 otherwise. 
DEC31 = 1, if fiscal year ends on 31 December, 0 otherwise. 
SUBS = square root of number of subsidiaries. 
GCOPIN = 1, if going concern uncertainty opinion is issued, 0 otherwise. 
LNSIZE = natural log of total assets. 
 
The audit lag model incorporates control variables such as audit firm 
quality, busy period, client complexity, client business risk and client size. 
Companies that are audited by international accounting firms are expected to 
have shorter audit lags because these firms have highly experienced auditors and 
advanced audit technologies at their disposal. Knechel and Payne (2001) show 
that clients with fiscal years that end during the busy period (December and 
January for the audit firm used in their sample) face longer lags. Number of 
subsidiaries is one of the measures used to indicate a client's business complexity, 
and Ng and Tai (1994) and Jaggi and Tsui (1999) show that there is a positive 
relationship between number of subsidiaries and audit lag. Geiger and Rama 
(2003) show that financially distressed companies require auditors to exercise a 
significant amount of professional judgement which may lag the issuing of the 
audit report. Hence, an association is expected between the issuance of going 
concern uncertainty opinion and the timeliness of the audit report. Ashton et al. 
(1989) argue that larger companies may choose to implement stronger internal 
controls which enable auditors to place more reliance on interim compliance tests 
than on substantive tests of year end balances, thus facilitating timely audit 
completion. Furthermore, large companies are usually owned and monitored by 









Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables investigated in this study. 
The minimum audit report lag is 19 days and maximum is 332 days. On average, 
Malaysian listed companies take about 100 days to issue audit reports after the 
fiscal year ended 2002. The audit lag for our sample is shorter than the sample 
reported by Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008). They examine the 1993 annual 
reports of 304 Malaysian non-financial companies and document audit lag of 116 
days. It seems that over the period 1993–2002, audit report lag in Malaysia 
reduced by about two weeks. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Variable Min Max Mean SD 
ACSIZE 1 6 3.51 .74 
ACIND 0 1 .68 .16 
ACMEET4 0 1 .95 .22 
ACEXP 0 1 .38 .19 
BSIZE 2 17 7.64 1.98 
BIND 0 1 .39 .13 
CEODUAL 0 1 .13 .34 
BIG4 0 1 .74 .44 
DEC31 0 1 .52 .50 
Number of subsidiaries 0 306 15.22 25.61 
GCOPIN 0 1 .16 .37 
Total assets 
 (RM million) 
3.62 62794 1165 4123 
AUDLAG (days) 19 332 100.30 27.37 
 
Notes: All the variables are defined in the Research Methodology section. 
 
For our sample, the average size of audit committee is 3.5 people, which 
is comparable to Yatim, Kent and Clarkson (2006), but slightly lower than Mohd-
Saleh, Mohd-Iskandar and Rahmat (2007), who document an average size of 3.7 
people. There is one company with only one audit committee member, and the 
explanation given in the annual report of the said company is that Bursa Malaysia 
had given its approval for the company for an extension of time up to                         
30 September 2003 to comply with the Listing Requirements. About two thirds of 
audit committee members are independent directors, which is consistent with 
Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006). The average number of audit 
committee meetings is 4.8 times (not tabulated) and 95% of the sample 
companies have at least four audit committee meetings during the year. This is 
slightly higher than Mohd-Saleh et al. (2007) who show that the average number 
of audit committee meetings in 2001 was 4.2 times. In term of background on 
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audit committees, on average about 40% of audit committee members have 
knowledge in accounting or finance. This is slightly higher than the figure 
obtained by Mohd-Saleh et al. (2007) where they report that 27% of audit 
committee members have accounting knowledge.  
 
The average board size for our sample is 7.6 people, in line with Yatim et 
al. (2006) who obtain an average board size of 7.5. On average, our sample has 
40% independent directors on the board, similar to Abdullah et al. (2010) who 
report board independence at 43%. Eighty-seven percent of our sample 
companies split the role of CEO and Chairman, which is in line with Yatim et al. 
(2006) and Abdullah et al. (2010) who report non-CEO duality of 84% and 93% 
respectively. Seventy four percent of our sample companies are audited by BIG4 
audit firms. Slightly more than half of our sample companies have their financial 
year end on 31 December 2002. Our sample companies have 15 subsidiaries, on 
average. Sixteen percent of our sample companies received going concern audit 
opinions. A review of audit reports in Malaysia by Md-Ali, Abdul-Kadir, 
Mohamad-Yusof and Lee (2009) show that in 2002, out of 752 companies, 105 
(14%) received unqualified opinions with emphasis of matter, 21 (2.8%) 
companies received qualified opinion and 10 (1.3%) received disclaimer 
opinions.  
 
Table 3 provides further analysis of the descriptive statistics by 
partitioning the sample according to the length of audit lag. Four groups are 
categorised; (i) less than two months, (ii) two to three months, (iii) three to four 
months, and (iv) more than four months. Some interesting results emerged. 
Fifteen companies (2.5%) failed to comply with the Listing Requirement to have 
their audited accounts ready within four months after the fiscal year ended. 
According to Bursa Malaysia, the incidence of late submission of audited 
accounts has reduced by 2009, with "rate of compliance by PLCs for submission 
of financial statements by the due time was greater than 99%" (Bursa Malaysia, 
Media Release, 25 March 2010). About 15% of the sample companies completed 
their audited accounts within two months after the fiscal year ended. Similarly, 
15% of the audit firms signed off the sample companies' audited financial 
statements in the third month following the end of the fiscal year. The bulk of the 
sample companies, i.e., about two thirds, issued their auditor's reports in the 
fourth month after the fiscal year ended. 
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Of all the four groups, the noncompliance group has, on average, the 
smallest audit committee and board size, lowest number of audit committee 
meetings, highest incidence of CEO duality and receiving going concern 
uncertainty audit opinion, lowest incidence of being audited by BIG4 audit firms 
and the most number of subsidiaries. The shortest audit lag group has, on 
average, the highest audit committee size, highest incidence of engaging BIG4 
audit firms, highest incidence of conducting at least four audit committee 
meetings, and lowest occurrence of receiving going concern audit opinion, among 
all the groups. Companies with the longest audit lag also have the highest board 
and audit committee independence, compared to their counterparts with the 
shortest audit lag. Similar to our results, Abdullah et al. (2010) also show that 
companies that restated their financial statements have higher board 
independence and audit committee independence than their counterparts that have 
no financial restatements.  
 
Table 4 shows the Pearson Correlation. The highest correlation is 
between the two control variables, firm size and number of subsidiaries at 0.569, 
which suggests that multicollinearity is not a serious problem that would 




Table 5 exhibits the multiple regression results. Two audit committee 
characteristics, namely audit committee size (ACSIZE) and audit committee with 
at least four meetings (ACMEET4), have a significantly negative association with 
audit report lag. Although audit committee independence (ACIND) and 
competencies (ACEXP) have the expected negative relationship with audit lag, 
neither of the variables are statistically significant.  
 
The proportion of independent directors on the board (BIND) has a weak 
positive relationship with audit lag. Larger board size (BSIZE) also seems to 
exacerbate audit lag, although it is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, 
contrary to expectation, CEO duality reduces audit lag, albeit insignificantly. All 
the control variables influence audit lag in the predicted direction except for 
financial year end (DEC31). A top tier auditor (BIG4) and larger client 
(FIRMSIZE) are associated with shorter lag, whereas more subsidiaries (SUBS) 
and going concern uncertainty (GCOPIN) prolong audit lag. Using Malaysian 
data for 1993–1995, Che-Ahmad, Houghton and Mohamad-Yusof (2006) also 
show that clients of Big6 auditors have significantly shorter audit lags than their 




which is 16% is similar with that reported by Raja-
Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) and Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008) of 14% and 
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20%,  respectively. Our results, which show that a more active and larger audit 
committee is desirable in enhancing the quality of financial reporting in terms of 
audit timeliness, is consistent with evidence provided by Kent et al. (2010). The 
more frequent audit committee meetings are held, the more likely the audit 
committee can reach solutions on financial issues and the auditors can issue 
timely reports. The evidence that firms with more members in the audit 
committee are more likely to have good quality financial reporting is in contrast 
with the evidence from previous studies such as Abbott et al. (2004) and Bédard 
et al. (2004), but consistent with Lin, Li and Yang (2006). This suggests that 
larger audit committees are more likely to be able to devote adequate time and 
effort to ensure that the information disclosed in the financial statements is 





Variable Coefficients  t-value 
(Constant) 202.611 12.140*** 
ACSIZE –.119 –2.705*** 
ACIND –.010 –.239 
ACMEET4 –.076 –2.028** 
ACEXP –.049 –1.269 
BSIZE .016 .327 
BIND .080 1.780* 
CEODUAL –.016 –.444 
BIG4 –.146 –3.912*** 
DEC31 .048 1.287 
SUBS .226 4.944*** 
GCOPIN .184 4.774*** 
LNSIZE –.246 –5.160*** 
F value 11.05  
Adj. R squared 0.16  
P value .000  
 
Dependent variable: AUDLAG. 
*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, based on one-tailed results. 





Audit committee effectiveness remains one of the significant themes in corporate 
governance debates (Gendron & Bédard, 2006). The main objective of this study 
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is to examine the relationships between audit committee characteristics and the 
timeliness of audit reporting. The characteristics of an audit committee that we 
examined are size, independence, expertise and frequency of meeting. The 
evidence indicates that firms with more members in the audit committee and 
more frequent audit committee meetings are more likely to produce audit reports 
in a timely manner. This study also demonstrates that the boards of director 
variables are not as important as audit committees in determining the audit lag. 
The result of this study also suggests that more emphasis should be given to 
strengthening the independence and expertise of the audit committee. The recent 
proposal by Bursa Malaysia as contained in the Consultation Paper No. 3/2010, 
which requires that in an appointment of independent directors public listed 
companies must set out the reasons why they consider the independent director as 
being "independent", is a step in the right direction to enable investors to assess 
the quality of independent directors [Proposal 1.2 (10)]. This development is in 
tandem with emerging literature that examines whether independent directors 
who are without financial or familial ties to the management but who have social 
ties to management can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Hoitash, in 
press). 
 
This study is subject to several limitations. Since the study covers a one-
year period, the trend of audit lag and long term effect of corporate governance 
on timeliness of audit report could not be examined. Another limitation of this 
study is the possibility of error in the archival measure of audit committee 
quality. Audit committee compensation may be a better proxy for audit 
committee quality, but remains unexplored because the compensation data are not 
widely available. To enhance the explanatory power of the audit lag model, future 
studies may consider the strength of the firm's internal controls and ownership 
structure and complex transactions such as special items and related party 
transactions. Finally it is also illuminating to see whether audit reporting lag is 
associated with earnings management, and the consequences of audit lag on the 
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